With Zambia’s 13 August election approaching, the central question is not simply which campaign has attracted the largest crowds. It is which political formations have built the organizational infrastructure needed to convert support into votes. On that measure, the incumbent enters polling day with a significant structural advantage.
Zambia’s harmonized electoral system makes organization especially important. Voters will simultaneously choose the President, Members of Parliament and local authority representatives. Presidential campaigns therefore operate within a wider network of parliamentary, ward and grassroots structures. Those structures can determine not only turnout, but also a party’s ability to protect votes once polling begins.
The conventional account of this election focuses on the campaign trail. President Hakainde Hichilema and Vice-President W.K. Mutale Nalumango, representing the United Party for National Development (UPND), have pursued a disciplined nationwide strategy, dividing into two teams to cover all ten provinces. Challenger Brian Mundubile of the National Reconciliation Party for Unity and Prosperity (NRPUP), together with his running mate Makebi Zulu, has travelled jointly under the Tonse Alliance banner and reached less than half the country. The incumbent has campaigned on economic stabilization, citing lower inflation, debt restructuring, free public education and an expanded Constituency Development Fund. The opposition, meanwhile, has struggled to establish a compelling alternative, compounded by a widely criticized BBC interview and messaging associated with a return to the Edgar Lungu era.
But campaign performance is only part of the story. The more consequential weakness emerged during the official nomination period, 18–22 May 2026.
According to Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) nomination filings and data compiled by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), the UPND secured seven parliamentary seats uncontested because of opposition filing omissions or disqualifications. The NRPUP, which became the Tonse Alliance’s ballot vehicle after its arrangement with the FDD collapsed shortly before nominations closed, fielded candidates in only 156 of 226 parliamentary constituencies. The UPND fielded candidates in all 226.
The campaign performance is only part of the story. The more consequential weakness emerged during the official nomination period
The gap extends to local government. The UPND contested 115 of 116 mayoral and council chairperson seats, while the NRPUP fielded 88 candidates among the 437 candidates contesting those positions. At ward level, where there are more than 1,800 seats, the UPND stood everywhere; the opposition failed to nominate candidates in roughly a third of wards.
These figures are often read as evidence of opposition unpopularity. That is too simple. More importantly, they reveal an organizational weakness with direct consequences for vote protection.
In a harmonized election, a parliamentary or ward candidate is not simply a name on the ballot. That candidate provides the local machinery needed to deploy polling agents, monitor the count, verify results at aggregation centres and lodge complaints when procedural disputes arise. Where there is no candidate, there may be no party agent; where there is no agent, the party has fewer eyes on the process.
The opposition itself appeared to acknowledge this vulnerability when the NRPUP’s presidential affairs chairman publicly appealed for donations to meet vote-protection costs.
The organizational deficit is compounded by opposition fragmentation. Fourteen candidates are contesting the presidency under a two-round system requiring more than 50 percent to avoid a runoff. Harry Kalaba’s Orange Alliance, Fred M’membe’s People’s Pact, a divided Patriotic Front and the Tonse Alliance are competing for overlapping opposition voters against a single incumbent. The electoral system therefore gives an organizationally coherent incumbent an additional advantage when the opposition vote is dispersed across multiple tickets.
Professor Jonathan Moyo’s framework of the “co-dependency” of the harmonized vote is useful here, provided it is treated as an analytical proposition rather than a law of voter behaviour. Presidential, parliamentary and local campaigns can reinforce one another through shared networks, local mobilization and voter identification. When a presidential ticket lacks corresponding candidates further down the ballot, that mobilization chain becomes weaker, increasing the likelihood of fragmented campaigning and ticket-splitting.
This does not mean voters cannot split their tickets. They can, and they do. Nor does the absence of a local candidate automatically prevent a presidential candidate from winning votes. The point is narrower: broad candidate coverage gives parties stronger infrastructure for mobilization and vote protection.
Yet the incumbent should not mistake organizational advantage for popular endorsement.
Ballot access measures party capacity; it does not measure what voters want. In 2021, the Patriotic Front had extensive national structures, incumbency and access to state machinery, yet lost by roughly one million votes. Zambia has transferred power peacefully three times, in 1991, 2011 and 2021. Incumbency is therefore not inherently protective.
The Zambia Election Research Network (ZERN) Round 1 Survey points to a similar tension. President Hichilema leads on declared voting intention, at 55 percent against 13 percent for opposition parties, but 32 percent of respondents declined to disclose their choice. At the same time, only 36 percent of opposition supporters expected the election to be completely free and fair, compared with 62 percent of UPND supporters. Non-response on this scale should caution against treating the headline figure as a settled verdict.
There is also significant dissatisfaction further down the ballot. Respondents were nearly divided on whether their personal economic circumstances had improved: 38 percent said they had, while 41 percent said they had deteriorated. Only 33 percent intended to re-elect their sitting MP and 15 percent their sitting councillor. The presidential lead therefore coexists with substantial local-level disaffection.
The credibility of the result will ultimately depend not only on who wins, but on whether citizens and political actors regard the process as legitimate. Recent incidents-including fatalities in Kaputa and Mazabuka, suspended campaigning in some constituencies, attacks on opposition campaign teams in Luampa, and arrests of opposition leaders under the Cyber Crimes Act- have heightened concern about the electoral environment.
Regulatory changes have added another layer of scrutiny. The Constitutional Amendment Act No. 13 of 2025 and Electoral Process Amendment Act No. 12 of 2026 introduced changes including a reduction in the voter-register inspection period from 90 days to 14 days and the creation of 40 new proportional parliamentary seats linked to presidential vote share within a year of polling. Research cited from the Institute for Security Studies has warned that late institutional changes can create perceptions that electoral outcomes are being shaped by legal architecture rather than the ballot itself.
Zambia’s democratic reputation rests on more than the size of a presidential majority. It rests on three peaceful transfers of power and on the credibility of the institutions through which those transfers occurred. A large victory will strengthen that legacy only if the process itself commands confidence.
The lesson from this election is therefore not simply that the opposition ran a poor campaign. Its deeper failure was organizational. It assembled alliances at the top of the ticket while leaving significant parts of the ballot uncontested. The UPND, by contrast, built the kind of nationwide electoral machinery that turns political presence into votes and votes into defensible results.
On 13 August, President Hichilema is likely to be returned to office. But the governing party should resist reading that outcome as an unqualified verdict on its record. A substantial part of the result may reflect the opposition’s organizational weakness, electoral fragmentation and failure to build structures capable of competing at every level.
That distinction matters. Governments can celebrate electoral victories; oppositions can rebuild. The organization that produced this advantage can be replicated. Zambia’s next opposition challenge will not begin on the campaign trail. It will begin at the nomination desk.
- Figures cited are drawn from Electoral Commission of Zambia nomination notices, IFES election data, the Zambia Election Research Network Round 1 Survey (Beardsworth, Kabinga, Seekings and Wahman, March 2026) and contemporaneous reporting.
By Dr Blessing Ivan Vava and Dr Tamuka Charles Chirimambowa
Dr Vava is Executive Director of the Southern Africa Coalition for Democracy and Accountability (SACDA). Dr Chirimambowa is Director of the Masosote Institute for Political Economy (MIPE). They write in their personal capacities.
This article was first published by Dr Blessing Vava and Dr Tamuka Charles Chirimambowa, and it is published here with permission of the writers.
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